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The cognitive functioning of individuals with stronger endorsement of right-wing and 
prejudiced attitudes has elicited much scholarly interest. Whereas many studies investigated 
cognitive styles, less attention has been directed towards cognitive ability. Studies 
investigating the latter topic generally reveal lower cognitive ability to be associated with 
stronger endorsement of right-wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice. However, this 
relationship has remained widely unrecognized in literature. The present meta-analyses 
revealed an average effect size of r = -.20 (CI 95%: -.23 to -.17; based on 67 studies, N = 
84,017) for the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes, and 
an average effect size of r = -.19 (CI 95%: -.23 to -.16; based on 23 studies, N = 27, 011) for 
the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice. Effect sizes did not vary significantly 
across different cognitive abilities and sample characteristics. The effect strongly depended on 
the measure used for ideological attitudes and prejudice, with the strongest effect sizes for 
authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. We conclude that cognitive ability is an important factor 
in the genesis of ideological attitudes and prejudice, and thus should become more central in 
theorizing and model-building. 
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The association of cognitive ability with right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice: 
A meta-analytic review 
Cognitive ability pertains to an individual’s capacity to perform higher cognitive processes, 
such as problem solving, reasoning, remembering, and understanding. Although at first glance 
cognitive ability may only seem relevant to performance on cognitive and intellectual tasks, it 
has many social implications as well. Indeed, higher cognitive ability is related to a host of 
social behaviors and interactions, such as increased interpersonal sensitivity (Murphy & Hall, 
2011), higher altruism (Millet & Dewitte, 2006), and greater (political) trust (Sturgis, Read, & 
Allum, 2010). Furthermore, research has shown that cognitive ability has substantial effects 
on attitude formation as well, demonstrating correlations with lower levels of religiosity 
(Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013) and a greater preference for evolutionary novel ideas 
(Kanazawa, 2010, 2012). The role of cognitive ability may also be important for our 
understanding of both prejudice and ideological attitudes, a topic on the agenda of scholars 
more than 60 years ago (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 
1954; for a review, see Dhont & Hodson, 2014). As concluded by Adorno and colleagues, 
“the most ethnocentric are, on the average, less intelligent than the least ethnocentric” (p. 
284). In line with this observation, several recent investigations confirm that greater cognitive 
ability is negatively related with right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice (e.g., Deary, 
Batty, & Gale, 2008; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010).  
Yet, the vast majority of contemporary theories explaining intergroup attitudes and 
behavior specify little or no theoretical role for cognitive abilities, instead focusing on factors 
such as intergroup contact (Hodson & Hewstone, 2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), anxiety 
and threat (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; 
Stephan, 2014), social identity concerns (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), competition for dominance 
or resources (Bobo, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), empathy (Batson et al., 1997), essentialist 
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thinking (Hodson & Skorska, 2015; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a), outgroup dehumanization 
(Leyens et al., 2000; Hodson, MacInnis, & Costello, 2014), or disgust sensitivity (Hodson et 
al., 2013), to name a few. Mental or cognitive abilities, as related to ideological attitudes and 
prejudice, are strikingly absent from the comprehensive Handbook of Social Psychology 
(Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010), and from popular and widely-used texts and textbooks that 
deal specifically with stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (e.g., Brown, 2010; Dovidio, 
Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; Nelson, 2009; Schneider, 2004; Whitley & Kite, 2010). To 
the extent that cognitive factors are implicated, the field largely emphasizes cognitive styles, 
that is, preferences for modes of information processing, such as need for closure or structure 
(e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b; Van Hiel et al., 
2010). In other words, motivation for simple and ordered thinking drives people toward right-
leaning ideologies and prejudice.  
All of these factors are arguably important correlates of ideological attitudes and 
prejudice, but what about cognitive abilities? It is possible that contemplating these relations 
is considered unsavory, contentious, or overly controversial, encouraging researchers to 
underplay links between, for instance, ability and ideology (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; 
Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2012), with such topics possibly considered “impolite” 
for academic discussion (see Hodson, 2014). Moreover, there exist strong doubts in the field 
about whether mental abilities are actually relevant contributors to the outcomes we seek to 
explain. For instance, Duarte and colleagues (in press) opine that, based on their reading of 
the literature, the data do “…not yield a consistent liberal advantage [in abilities], even a 
small one”. This raises the question of whether relations exist between ability on the one 
hand, and ideology and prejudice, on the other, and whether such relations represent very 
small effects (and are thus inconsequential) or sizeable (and thus relevant to explaining 
ideology and intergroup relations).  
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In keeping with the Association for Psychological Science (APS) best practices, and 
an emphasis on the “new statistics” (Cumming, 2014), we bring a cumulative science 
approach to this research question, conducting a meta-analysis of the empirical studies of the 
association of cognitive ability with right-wing ideology and prejudice. We argue that meta-
analyses are particularly needed and valuable when relations between variables are relatively 
unknown or under-represented, and when variable inter-relations are controversial and 
contentious, as with the relation between cognitive ability and ideology
i
. In such 
circumstances, meta-analyses not only provide a quantitative review of the existing literature, 
but offer generative insights for new research and theorizing. In our analysis, we were 
especially interested in whether the strength of the relations under study depends on the type 
of cognitive ability. Based on the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of cognitive ability 
(McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew, 2012), we distinguished between different types of 
cognitive abilities. We also investigated the potential moderating effects of several other 
variables such as type of outcome and sample characteristics. 
Right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice: the role of cognition 
Prejudice largely involves negative evaluations of and beliefs about out-groups, such 
as other ethnic groups, women, homosexuals, and elderly.  Two broad research traditions have 
historically sought to unveil the psychological basis of prejudice. Whereas some focused on 
the impact of situational and contextual factors, such as (intergroup) threat (e.g., Riek et al., 
2006), others investigated the role of individual differences and personality predispositions 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954). In their well-known book “The Authoritarian 
Personality”, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that authoritarian personality characteristics lead 
people to adhere to extreme right-wing parties and prejudice. Since then, other relevant 
attitudinal individual differences have been related to right-wing ideology and prejudice, 
including tough-mindedness (Eysenck, 1954), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), and conservatism 
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(Wilson, 1973). These attitudes can all be divided under the category of “right-wing socio-
cultural attitudes”, broadly referring to adherence to traditional values and norms and 
resistance to change (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost et al., 2003). Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 1981, 1998) is a typical indicator of this pattern of broad 
social beliefs (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). The three RWA facets - uncritically submitting to 
authorities, adhering to societal norms and traditions, and showing aggressiveness toward 
individuals who deviate from these conventional norms and values – all tap into the social-
cultural domain. Most conservatism scales and dogmatism also refer to the social-cultural 
domain.  
We focus on one prominent research question that has elicited interest among scholars 
for a long time. Specifically, do individuals with stronger endorsement of right-wing and 
prejudiced attitudes score higher or lower on specific cognitive characteristics, differentiating 
them from individuals with rather left-wing and less prejudiced attitudes?  In social 
psychological literature, there is a long and widely accepted tradition linking limited cognitive 
resources with intergroup biases and ideological attitudes. For instance, the well-known study 
by Gilbert and Hixon (1991), a staple in most prejudice textbooks, demonstrated that when 
cognitively busy (e.g., rehearsing a digit sequence, or performing a visual search task while 
performing the central task) participants are less likely to activate stereotypes but are 
significantly more likely to apply (i.e., “use”) stereotypes that are activated (or salient). Others 
have observed that people under high (vs. low) cognitive load are more likely to recall 
stereotypic traits (e.g., Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Pratto & Bargh, 1991). With 
regard to ideological attitudes, Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, and Blanchar (2012) have 
demonstrated that inducing low-effort thinking (e.g., alcohol consumption, cognitive load, 
time pressure) results in stronger endorsement of politically conservative ideologies, such that 
“conservatism may be a process consequence of low-effort thought” (Eidelman et al., 2012, p. 
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808). Underlying each of these experimental methodologies is the assumption that lower 
availability of cognitive resources elicits more social conservatism and prejudice-relevant 
thinking. This basic premise, when framed experimentally within a social psychology context, 
courts little controversy. Yet, when exported to the realm of individual differences, such that 
those relatively lower in cognitive abilities are purportedly relatively higher in social 
conservatism and prejudicial attitudes, this idea has less traction. However, the underlying 
principles are very closely related if not analogous– to the extent that lesser mental ability is 
related to these outcomes, this should be true whether the ability limitation is based on an 
individual difference or is experimentally induced (see E. T. Higgins, 2000, for a discussion 
of “general principles” across person and situation effects).  
Indeed, some scholars have argued that individuals with lower cognitive skills are 
relatively ill-equipped to process complex and new social information and to understand 
constantly changing societal contexts. Therefore, they are more likely to stick to what is 
presently known and considered acceptable, rather than being open-minded and appreciating 
multidimensional perspectives (Deary et al., 2008; Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011; 
McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999; Stankov, 2009). By emphasizing 
societal traditions, the preservation of the status-quo and strict group boundaries, ideologies 
endorsing resistance to social change, i.e., right-wing ideologies (see Jost et al., 2003), should 
be particularly appealing to those with relatively lower cognitive abilities (e.g., Heaven et al., 
2011; Keiller, 2010; Stankov, 2009). According to this theoretical perspective, therefore, 
right-wing ideologies provide well-structured and ordered views about society and intergroup 
relations, thereby psychologically minimizing the complexity of the social world. 
Theoretically, therefore, those with fewer cognitive resources drift towards right-wing 
conservative ideologies in an attempt to increase psychological control over their context. 
Furthermore, studies have shown that being cognitively restricted when engaging in complex 
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mental processing and high-effort thinking (Eidelman et al., 2012) facilitates reliance on 
simple heuristics in social judgments which in turn lead to quick and biased views about other 
groups (Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Keiller, 2010). Although initially 
under- investigated, cognitive ability has gradually gained importance in the field of 
ideological attitudes and prejudice (e.g., Deary et al., 2008; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson, 
2014; Van Hiel et al., 2010). In the next sections, we provide an overview of the empirical 
studies investigating associations of cognitive ability with both right-wing ideological 
attitudes and prejudice. 
Cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes 
Adorno et al. (1950) already investigated the relationship between cognitive ability 
and authoritarianism, and many studies followed this first inquiry, reporting negative relations 
between cognitive ability and authoritarianism (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Christie, 1954; 
Davids & Eriksen, 1957; Jacobson & Rettig, 1959; Siegel, 1956). Similar results were 
obtained with the Dogmatism scale (Long & Ziller, 1965; Thompson & Michel, 1972; Uhes 
& Shaver, 1970) and, more recently, for a range of measures tapping right-wing  ideological 
attitudes (e.g., Bouchard, Segal, Tellegen, McGue, Keyes, & Krueger, 2003; Kanazawa, 2010; 
Keiller, 2010; McCourt et al., 1999). Further evidence for this association was obtained on the 
cross-national level by Stankov (2009), who found that inhabitants of conservative countries 
typically show lower average performance across different ability tests. A meta-analysis (Van 
Hiel et al., 2010), including data from 50 studies, reported an average correlation of r = -.26 
between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes, including conservatism, 
authoritarianism and dogmatism. Moreover, several longitudinal studies, some using large 
representative samples, provided evidence for the direction of the relation, demonstrating that 
lower general cognitive ability in childhood relates to stronger endorsement of conservative 
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and authoritarian attitudes later in life (Block & Block, 2006; Deary et al., 2008; Fraley, et al., 
2012; Heaven et al., 2011; Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, & Deary, 2010).  
Remarkably, despite the use of various cognitive ability measures across studies, 
scholars paid little attention to the potential differential impact of the various types of 
cognitive ability. However, a few studies simultaneously contrasted various types of cognitive 
abilities. For instance, Heaven et al. (2011) reported that among 12-13 year olds, lower verbal 
abilities predict RWA five years later in time, whereas numerical abilities did not show such 
longitudinal effect. Kemmelmeier (2008) observed weak significant negative associations of 
verbal ability with two of three indicators for conservative attitudes and a positive association 
with a third indicator (i.e., anti-regulation attitudes), yet numerical ability did not yield any 
significant association. Choma, Hodson, Hoffarth, Charlesford, and Hafer (2014) similarly 
found numerical reasoning to be unrelated to RWA. Deary et al. (2008) reported negative 
relationships of comparable strength between conservatism (i.e. items tapping into political 
distrust, social conservatism, and anti-working women) on the one hand and two verbal ability 
tasks (mean r across sexes = -.18 and .-17), a reasoning task (mean r  = -.15), and a short-time 
memory task (mean r = -.10) on the other hand. In sum, the results of these few studies 
yielded rather mixed findings with respect to potential differences between cognitive ability 
types.  
Cognitive ability and prejudice 
 In the early studies, ethnocentrism, a form of prejudice towards ethnic out-groups in 
general, was particularly studied. Adorno et al. (1950) devoted an entire chapter on the 
relationship between cognitive ability and ethnocentrism, which was found to be negative. 
This initial finding was replicated in other studies across diverse samples and with diverse 
indicators of cognitive ability, such as reasoning tests (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Kutner & Gordon, 
1964; O’Connor, 1952), verbal ability tests (e.g., Egan, 1989) and general cognitive ability 
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tests (Rokeach, 1951). More recently, Meeusen, de Vroome, and Hooghe (2013) also revealed 
negative correlations between measures of verbal and mathematical abilities and 
ethnocentrism.  
Other studies recently focused on prejudice expressed toward specific out-groups. 
Keiller (2010) reported that abstract reasoning is negatively related to prejudice against 
homosexuals. Costello and Hodson (2014) found that White children who are more able to 
comprehend hierarchical relations among objects (e.g., that cars and trucks belong to the 
superordinate category vehicles) express less racial bias towards Black children. Furthermore, 
longitudinal studies provided evidence for the effect of cognitive ability early in life on 
subsequent levels of prejudice. Analyzing large, representative data-sets, Deary et al. (2008), 
Schoon et al. (2010), and Hodson and Busseri (2012) demonstrated that cognitive ability in 
childhood not only leads to increased right-wing ideological attitudes, but also to increased 
racism later in adulthood. A recent literature review on this topic by Dhont and Hodson 
(2014) concluded that “the field will benefit from a recognition of, and open discussion about, 
differences in cognitive abilities between those lower versus higher in prejudice.” (p. 454). 
Similar to the literature on cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes, little 
attention has been devoted to the possible differential impact of distinct types of cognitive 
ability. Only one study (Deary et al., 2008), using a large and representative dataset, reported 
associations of various strength between racism and two verbal ability tasks (mean rs across 
sexes = -.23 and -.19), a reasoning task (mean r = -.15), and a short-time memory task (mean 
r = -.12). 
 The present study 
The present study is a meta-analytic integration of empirical research on the 
relationship of cognitive ability with both right-wing social-cultural ideological attitudes and 
intergroup prejudice. The present meta-analyses extend the meta-analysis on cognitive ability 
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by Van Hiel et al. (2010) in three important ways. First, since Van Hiel et al. collected 
samples for their meta-analysis in early 2009, several important studies, some with large 
samples or longitudinal data, have been published (e.g., Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & 
Busseri, 2012; Kanazawa, 2010; Keiller, 2010; Schoon et al., 2010; Stankov, 2009; Xu, Mar, 
& Peterson, 2013), which we included in the present analysis. Based on this literature and the 
meta-analysis of Van Hiel et al. (2010), we expected that lower cognitive abilities predict 
more right-wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice.  Second, whereas Van Hiel et al. 
only examined relationships with ethnocentrism as an indicator of prejudice, we also included 
studies that administered other indicators of prejudice (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2014; Keiller, 
2010). 
Third, the present meta-analysis aimed to investigate the potential differential effects 
of specific types of cognitive ability, which was not examined by Van Hiel and colleagues. 
Research to date has typically used very diverse types and measures of cognitive ability, but 
little attention has been directed towards the question whether particular types of cognitive 
ability might be especially relevant in ideology and prejudice. In other words, is the 
association between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice 
consistent across all types of cognitive ability, or are these relationships largely driven by 
particular types of cognitive abilities? To investigate this, we divided all samples included in 
our meta-analysis into categories according to the measure of cognitive ability employed. The 
cognitive ability measures were classified according to the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory 
of cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew, 2012), considered one of the 
most empirically well-supported and widely accepted comprehensive theoretical frameworks 
of the structure of cognitive abilities (e.g., Flanagan & Harris, 2012). Specifically, the CHC 
model proposed three levels: g is the highest level, representing general cognitive ability. 
Underlying g are nine primary broad domains who each contribute to the higher-order g-
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factor. These nine primary domains are: Fluid reasoning (Gf), the broad ability to reason and 
solve novel problems; Comprehension-knowledge ability (Gc), static abilities based on one’s 
previously acquired knowledge; Short-term memory (Gsm), the ability to encode, maintain 
and manipulate information in the immediate situation; Long-term storage and retrieval (Glr), 
the ability to store and retrieve information in long-term memory; Visual-spatial processing 
(Gv), the ability to perceive, generate, store, and retrieve visual and spatial information; 
Auditory processing (Ga), abilities involved in detecting and interpreting sounds; Cognitive 
processing speed (Gs), the ability to quickly and fluently perform relatively simple cognitive 
tasks; Reading and Writing (Grw), individual’s depth and breadth of reading and writing 
knowledge and skills; and finally, Quantitative knowledge (Gq), the individual’s depth and 
breadth of quantitative or mathematical knowledge and skills.  
 In sum, the present meta-analysis extends the meta-analysis of Van Hiel et al. (2010) 
by a) including new and recent studies for the relationship between cognitive ability and right-
wing ideological attitudes, b) including various measures of prejudice, and c) investigating 
whether the specific type of cognitive ability influences the strength of the relationship.  
Because it is widely acknowledged that right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice are 
conceptually distinct (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001), we perform two separate meta-
analyses, one for the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological 
attitudes and one for the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice (including both 
measures of generalized prejudice and prejudice towards specific groups).  
Method 
Selection of studies: search strategies and inclusion criteria 
Studies for this meta-analysis were selected by using a variety of search strategies. 
First, we identified the relevant studies included in Van Hiel et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, 
excluding the studies focusing on education rather than pure cognitive abilities. Second, we 
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searched the databases ISI Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar for studies published until 
November 2014. We used a variety of keywords in various combinations. Keywords for right-
wing ideological attitudes were authoritarianism, conservatism, and dogmatism. Keywords for 
intergroup prejudice were racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, prejudice, ethnic prejudice, racial 
prejudice, and intolerance. Keywords for cognitive ability were cognitive ability, mental 
ability, reasoning, intelligence, and IQ. Third, we checked the references list of each relevant 
article for additional studies of interest. Finally, we contacted researchers in the field to share 
relevant unpublished data. We distributed our call for unpublished data via the websites or 
mailing lists of the International Society of Political Psychology, Society for Personality and 
Social Psychology, European Association of Social Psychology, and the Social Psychology 
Network. Three researchers contacted us and shared their unpublished data.  
Studies had to meet several criteria to be included in the meta-analysis. First, studies 
had to administer at least one measure of right-wing ideological attitudes or intergroup 
prejudice and at least one measure of cognitive ability. Furthermore, no sample overlap was 
allowed because samples included in a meta-analysis have to be statistically independent 
(Card, 2012; Mullen, 1989). When studies included multiple types of ideological or out-group 
attitudes, or multiple types of cognitive ability in the same sample, we selected the type least 
prevalent across the other samples (see also Onraet et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2010). When 
multiple indicators of a single type of right-wing ideological or out-group attitudes (e.g., 
multiple subscales of a conservatism scale) or multiple indicators of a single primary domain 
of cognitive ability (e.g., different indicators of fluid ability) were administered, the mean 
correlation was calculated and used for the analyses.  
Study Characteristics and Coding 
 For the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes, we 
found 67 samples, with a total of 84,017 unique participants, meeting the inclusion criteria for 
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the meta-analysis.  For the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice, we found 23 
samples, with a total of 27,011 unique participants, meeting the inclusion criteria for the meta-
analysis. All studies are displayed in Table 1, and forest plots with each study’s effect size 
and 95% CIs are displayed in Figure 1 (for right-wing ideological attitudes) and Figure 2 (for 
prejudice). In total, over both meta-analyses combined, we now have 82 unique samples, with 
94,398 unique participants. We retrieved 32 additional studies which comprised 78,840 extra 
participants compared to the meta-analysis of Van Hiel et al. (2010). 
We coded each sample for design, sample, and publication characteristics. First, we 
coded each study according to the specific type right-wing ideological attitudes or prejudice 
used: authoritarianism, conservatism
ii
, or dogmatism for right-wing ideological attitudes, and 
ethnocentrism, or prejudice towards specific groups as types of prejudice. Next, we also 
coded the type of cognitive ability according to the CHC model. We decided to create two 
moderator variables for the distinction between different types of cognitive. First, we 
distinguished between different levels of cognitive ability. More specifically, we coded 
whether the measure tapped (a) a higher order factor of general ability (studies using scores of 
entire intelligence tests, or studies combining several types of broad abilities into one factor) 
or (b) one specific type of broad primary ability (without specifying which type of broad 
primary ability). For the second moderator variable, we coded the latter studies according to 
the specific type of primary broad domains of the CHC model. For this second moderator 
analysis on type of cognitive ability, the studies using general ability measures were not 
included.  
Sample characteristics were according to age group in which cognitive ability was 
administered: (children (0 – 11 year old), adolescents (12 – 17 year old), young adolescents 
(18 – 27 year old) and adults (27+ year old); sex composition: mixed sex, males only, females 
only; and geographic location of the sample: United States/Canada, Europe, and other. As an 
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indicator of publication characteristic, the year of data acquisition was coded into three 
categories, 1950 – 1969, 1970 – 1989, and 1990 – present. 
Statistical analyses 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (rs) between cognitive ability and 
right-wing ideological attitudes/prejudice were used as effect size estimates. For studies 
reporting mean differences in scores on right-wing ideological attitudes or prejudice across 
groups with low or high cognitive ability, the reported test statistics (F-, t- or p-values) were 
used for calculating the effect sizes (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). Three 
samples only reported a p-value. In these cases, we used the lower limit effect size estimates 
from the reported significance level. This meta-analytic decision is commonly used but a 
conservative strategy that tends to underestimate the true magnitude of effect sizes (Durlak & 
Lipsey, 1991). 
 For the statistical meta-analyses, we used the software Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 
version 2.2 (Borenstein et al., 2005) in combination with metaphor, a meta-analysis package 
for R (Viechtbauer, 2010). We applied a random-effects model to compute the overall effects, 
because we assumed that effect sizes would vary across studies. Random-effects models 
produce results that can be generalized to future studies with different designs (Hedges & 
Vevea, 1998). First, Fisher-Z coefficients were calculated based on the Pearson correlations to 
permit an unbiased comparison of effect sizes. Second, we computed mean weighted effect 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals around the point estimate of the combined estimates. 
Next, for interpretation conveniences, the effect size estimates were transformed back to 
correlations. According to Cohen (1988), effect sizes (rs) of .10 are considered small, .30 are 
considered moderate, and .50 are considered large effects.  Based on an analysis of meta-
analysis in psychological research, Hemphill (2003) recommended interpreting effect sizes of 
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.10, .20, .30 as small, moderate, and large effects, respectively, to better reflect effect sizes in 
psychology per se.  
Homogeneity analyses were conducted to test whether the sets of effect sizes were 
homogeneous at the population level and allowed us to examine the role of potential 
moderator variables. We conducted these moderation analyses using categorical testing 
procedures (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). A significant within-groups Q (Qw) indicates that the 
effect sizes within each moderator category are heterogeneous, whereas a significant between-
groups Q (Qb) estimate indicates that the effect sizes of the moderator subgroups are 
significantly different. I² indices (J. P. T. Higgins & Thompson, 2002) indicate the percentage 
of variability in point estimates due to between-study heterogeneity, rather than sampling 
error (I² = 0 indicates that all variability in effect estimates is caused by sampling error; I²-
values on the order of 25, 50, and 75 represent low, moderate, and high between-study 
heterogeneity).  
Finally, we addressed the robustness of the meta-analytical estimates by performing 
sensitivity analyses. These evaluate (and adjust for) the impact of publication bias as well as 
the impact of outliers and influential studies. The accuracy of a meta-analysis strongly 
depends upon the representativeness of the sample of studies analyzed. Publication bias is one 
source that potentially jeopardizes the representativeness of a meta-analytical sample set 
because the likelihood that a study gets published hinges upon the presence of significant 
results (Kepes, Banks, McDaniel, & Whetsel, 2012; Kepes, McDaniel, Brannick, & Banks, 
2013; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). Hence, publication bias might overestimate the 
meta-analytical effect sizes. Another important source that potentially questions meta-analytic 
conclusions is the presence of outliers and influential cases (Kepes et al., 2013; Viechtbauer 
& Chueng, 2010). Even though it is not uncommon to observe extreme effect size values 
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when conducting a meta-analysis, it is mandatory to illuminate to which extent these 
outliers/influential cases weigh upon the meta-analytic conclusions.  
These sensitivity analyses involved the combination of four recommended techniques 
(Kepes et al., 2012; Kepes et al., 2013; Stanley & Doucouliagos; 2014; Viechtbauer & 
Chueng, 2010). First, we addressed the presence of publication bias and outliers by visually 
inspecting contour-enhanced funnel plots (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2008; 
Kepes et al., 2013; Sterne et al., 2011). Contour-enhanced funnel plots display the magnitude 
of each study’s effect size as a function of the sample’s standard error (Sterne et al., 2011), 
allowing visual inspection of the symmetry of the meta-analytical study distribution. In the 
funnel plots, the grey shaded areas indicate different levels of statistical significance, whereas 
the white (unshaded) area indicates the non-significance of the study effect sizes. In the 
presence of publication bias, it is expected that the bottom of a plot (where the smaller studies 
are located) will show a higher concentration of studies on one side of the mean than the 
other. The missing studies in the underrepresented area would primarily be located in the 
white (non-significant) regions of the plot. If these two visual features are present, this would 
reflect publication bias, resulting from the phenomenon that smaller studies only get 
published if they have larger than average effects, because this makes them more likely to 
attain statistical significance criteria (Peters et al., 2008; Sterne et al., 2011).  
Second, we applied the trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) to identify and 
adjust for publication bias. This method is an iterative, statistical procedure based upon the 
notion that - in the absence of publication bias - the funnel plot would be symmetrically 
dispersed around the summary effect. The trim-and-fill procedure estimates the number of 
missing studies in a dataset by “trimming” the funnel plot until it is symmetrical and then 
“filling” in both sides of the funnel in a way that maintains symmetry. Based upon the 
imputation (“filling”) of missing effect sizes, the procedure then re-estimates an adjusted 
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pooled effect size as sensitivity analysis. We added the trim-and-fill-imputations to the 
contour-enhanced funnel plots because they help to inform the likely location of missing 
studies (Peters et al., 2008).  
Third, because the trim-and-fill-method has recently been criticized in the literature 
(e.g., lower ability to detect publication bias, tendency for under-correction of publication 
bias; Carter & McCullough, 2014; Peters et al., 2008), we also applied Egger’s linear 
regression procedure (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Sterne & Egger, 2001). This 
test is also based upon the funnel plot but does not implicitly assume that publication bias is 
the only cause of funnel plot asymmetry. Egger’s test can be described as a weighted least 
squares regression model in which the effect size is predicted by the standard error. The (non-
)significance of the coefficient associated with standard error (i.e, the slope, b1) is interpreted 
as a test of funnel plot asymmetry and leads to conclude for the absence/presence of 
publication bias (Sterne & Egger, 2011). Interestingly, the use of this model is recently 
expanded by the recognition that in Egger’s regression equation, the model’s intercept (b0) 
can be interpreted as an estimate of the underlying effect size which is theoretically 
uninfluenced by publication bias (see for extensive discussions: Carter & McCullough, 2014; 
Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). This expansion of the use of Egger’s test is referred to as the 
“precision-effect test” (PET; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Simulation studies have now 
shown that PET-estimations are highly accurate when the true meta-analytic effect is zero, but 
tends to overcorrect when the true effect is non-zero. In these cases, the intercept of a 
regression model in which the effect size is predicted by the variance (i.e., standard error 
squared) provides more optimal estimates of the adjusted pooled effect size. This is referred to 
as a “precision-effect with standard error” (or PEESE; Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley 
& Doucouliagos, 2014). We adopted this conditional PET-PEESE procedure (i.e., if b0 using 
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PET is significant, PEESE adjusted estimates should be interpreted as unbiased effects) to 
calculate more accurate pooled effects adjusted for publication bias.  
In the final step of the sensitivity analyses, we addressed the impact of potential 
outliers and influential cases in the two core meta-analyses. In addition to the contour-
enhanced funnel plot providing a first visual sense of potential outliers (Kepes et al., 2013), 
we applied the set of outlier and influence diagnostics for meta-analyses proposed by 
Viechtbauer and Chueng (2010). This allows identification of particularly influential studies 
in both meta-analyses. Subsequently, we re-ran the meta-analyses without these outliers to 
evaluate to what extent these influential cases distort the conclusions of the meta-analyses. 
This type of sensitivity analyses may either strengthen the conclusions of the meta-analyses or 
leave some doubts regarding their robustness (Viechtbauer & Chueng, 2010). All sensitivity 
analyses were conducted using the metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). 
Results 
We performed two separate meta-analyses, one for the relationship between cognitive 
ability and right-wing ideological attitudes, and one for the relationship between cognitive 
ability and prejudice.  
Cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes  
Fifty-seven studies showed negative relations, 9 showed positive relations, and 1 
showed a correlation of approximately 0. The meta-analysis (for all results see Table 2) 
revealed an overall moderate negative relation, r = -.20, p < .001. In other words, lower 
cognitive ability was associated with the stronger endorsement of right-wing ideological 
attitudes. 
Moderator analyses 
Further analyses revealed that the effect size was heterogeneous, indicating that 
moderator variables might explain the differences in effect size among the samples. We tested 
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seven potential moderators (i.e., general or broad primary ability, type of broad ability, 
measure of right-wing ideological attitudes, age group, sex composition, location, and time 
period). Because we investigated more than one moderator variable, we corrected for multiple 
comparisons using a significance level of .007 (= .05/7).  Three moderator variables reached 
this significance level. First, the type of right-wing ideological attitudes was a significant 
moderator. More specifically, the strongest effect sizes were found for authoritarianism (r = -
.30), whereas weaker but still significant effect sizes were found for dogmatism (r = -.17) and 
conservatism (r = -.13). Second, the moderator type of primary broad ability was also 
significant. More specifically, the strongest effect sizes were obtained for long-term memory 
(r = -.39), comprehension-knowledge (r = -.23), and writing and reading (r = -.23).  Weaker, 
but still significant effect sizes were found for fluid abilities (r = -.13) and short-term memory 
(r = -.12). Third, effect sizes significantly differed across age groups. More specifically, the 
effect size was strongest when cognitive ability was measured among adolescents (r = -.32), 
compared to children (r = -.15), young adults (r = -.19) or adults (r = -.15). 
Cognitive ability and prejudice  
We found twenty-three studies reporting correlations between cognitive ability and 
prejudice, with twenty-one studies showing negative relations, 1 showing a positive relation, 
and 1 showing a correlation of approximately 0. The overall effect size for this relationship 
(see Table 3) was comparable to the effect size for right-wing ideological attitudes, r = -.19, p 
< .001, indicating that lower cognitive ability was associated with the stronger endorsement of 
prejudice.  
Moderator analyses 
We performed moderator analysis, revealing that the effect size was heterogeneous. As 
a result, we investigated moderator variables that might explain the differences in effect size 
among the samples. We looked at the same moderator variables as in the previous meta-
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analysis, with the exception of types of prejudice instead of types of right-wing ideological 
attitudes. Again, we corrected for multiple comparisons using a significance level of .007 (= 
.05/7).  We found evidence for two significant moderators. First, the type of prejudice was a 
significant moderator. More specifically, the effect size was strongest for ethnocentrism (r = -
.28) compared to prejudice towards specific groups (r = -.16). Second, age group was a 
significant moderator, with stronger effect sizes in groups of adolescents (r = -.24), adults (r = 
-.23), and young adults (r = -.21) compared to children (r = -.13). However, we acknowledge 
that only few samples were included for each of these age groups, making this moderator 
effect difficult to meaningfully interpret.  
Sensitivity analyses  
The validity of these two meta-analyses was addressed with sensitivity analyses 
evaluating the impact of publication bias and potential outliers/influential studies. These 
results are organized as an answer to three questions: (1) “Is there evidence of publication 
bias?”, (2) “How do the pooled effect sizes change if we adjust for  potential publication 
bias?”, and (3) “Which studies are outliers and how do they affect the meta-analytic 
estimates?”. Publication bias and outlier analyses were run on the full set of studies for the 
two meta-analyses, with the publication bias analyses also run on smaller sub-distributions 
(Kepes et al., 2012). We chose to analyze publication bias for each type of right-wing 
ideological attitudes and prejudice, as analyses identified these as the strongest moderator 
variables (explaining 93% and 42% of between-study variance, respectively).  
Is there evidence of publication bias?  
This question is addressed by the joint interpretation of three procedures: contour-
enhanced funnel plots, the trim-and-fill procedure, and significance of Egger’s regression tests 
(Kepes, et al., 2012; Peters et al., 2008). Figure 3 presents the contour-enhanced funnel plot 
with trim-and-fill imputations for the (sub)-meta-analyses on cognitive ability and right-wing 
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ideological attitudes. The trim-and-fill on the overall meta-analysis (Panel A) suggests that 11 
studies are missing at the right of the mean effect size. As the contour-enhanced funnel plot 
allows evaluation of the missing studies in the context of statistical significance, it can be 
noted that 10 of 11 studies are located in the grey-shaded areas of the plot. This suggests that 
funnel plot asymmetry primarily results from factors other than publication bias. Indeed, the 
separate publication bias analyses for each type of right-wing ideological attitudes (Panel B, 
C, D) strengthen this hypothesis as there is strong moderator-induced between-study 
heterogeneity. More specifically, within the sub-distributions for both authoritarianism (Panel 
B) and conservatism (Panel C), trim-and-fill does no longer impute studies at any side of the 
mean. Only for dogmatism (Panel D), two studies are imputed in the grey area. However, as 
this sub-distribution only includes 13 studies, these imputations can also be caused by the 
small set of studies in this meta-analysis. For all (sub-)meta-analyses, Egger’s regression tests 
for funnel plot asymmetry were performed. However, in none of these regression models, 
significant slope coefficients were found. This also strengthens the conclusion that publication 
bias is unlikely to distort the pooled estimate between cognitive ability and right-wing 
ideological attitudes.   
 Similar results are found for the (sub-)meta-analyses on the association between 
cognitive ability and prejudice. Figure 4 presents the contour-enhanced funnel plot with trim-
and-fill imputations for the overall meta-analysis on prejudice (Panel A), and the specific 
types of prejudices: ethnocentrism (Panel B) and prejudice towards specific groups (Panel C). 
The trim-and-fill on the overall meta-analysis imputes four studies at the right of the mean, 
with only two of them located in the white (non-significant) area of the plot. Trim-and-fill 
imputed three missing studies in the meta-analysis of ethnocentrism, and one in the meta-
analysis prejudice towards specific groups. However, funnel plot asymmetry in these subsets 
might be primarily related to the limited number of included studies. Also, for all (sub-)meta-
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analyses, Egger’s regression tests yield no significant slope coefficients. This strengthens the 
conclusion that publication bias is unlikely to distort the relation between cognitive ability and 
prejudice. 
How do the pooled effect sizes change if we adjust for potential publication bias? 
Table 4 presents the original and adjusted effect sizes provided by the trim-and-fill 
procedure and extended Egger’s regression procedure (i.e., PET-PEESE estimators). In line 
with the previous analyses, adjusted effect sizes are strongly similar to the original meta-
analytic estimates. All estimates remain significant (p <.001) and hence, the PEESE results 
can be regarded as the best estimates of the effect sizes corrected for publication bias (Carter 
& McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Notably, these PEESE-estimates 
provide a somewhat less negative effect between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological 
attitudes (r = -.15), and between cognitive ability and authoritarianism (r = -.23). All other 
PEESE-estimates resemble the original estimates.  
Which studies are outliers and how do they affect the pooled effect sizes? 
In the funnel plots of the overall meta-analyses (Figures 3-4, Panels A), no marked 
outliers were noted. Additionally, we performed a set of influence diagnostics for meta-
analyses (Viechtbauer & Chueng, 2010) to identify particularly influential cases. The last 
column of Table 4 presents the meta-analytic results without these outliers. In the right-wing 
ideological attitudes meta-analysis, three outliers/influential cases were identified. 
Interestingly, each of these studies represents each of the three types of right-wing ideological 
attitudes. For authoritarianism, the study of Rubenstein et al. (2014) was identified as outlier. 
This study provided a substantially stronger effect size (r = -.67; N = 111) than the other 
studies on authoritarianism. For conservatism, the study of Oskarsson et al. (in press) was 
identified as outlier. This study is the only one to report a positive correlation (r =.18). 
Moreover, the study used a large sample (N = 1946), adding substantial weight to the analysis. 
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For dogmatism, the study of Taylor and Dunnette (1974) was identified as outlier. This study 
is also the only one to report a positive correlation between cognitive ability and dogmatism (r 
= .29, N = 79). In the prejudice meta-analysis, influence diagnostics only identify Meeusen et 
al. (2013; r = - .29) as outlier. This study addressed ethnocentrism in a much larger sample (N 
= 1910) than the other ethnocentrism studies and hence its estimate adds substantial weight to 
the meta-analysis.  
Nevertheless, removing these four influential studies from the meta-analyses appears 
to have only very limited effect on the meta-analytic effect sizes (Table 4). Hence, also this 
type of sensitivity analyses validates the robustness of the current meta-analytic conclusions.  
General Discussion  
The present meta-analyses of the relationship of cognitive ability with ideological 
right-wing ideological attitudes and intergroup prejudice yielded four important results. First, 
we obtained convincing evidence for the presence of moderate negative associations between 
cognitive ability and both ideological right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice, that were 
relatively stable across different sample characteristics. Second, the negative relationship 
varied significantly across different subtypes of broad cognitive ability for ideological 
attitudes, but not for prejudice. Third, our analyses revealed that cognitive ability was not 
related to all types of right-wing ideological attitudes or prejudices equivalently. Fourth, 
sensitivity analyses show that the results are not strongly influenced by publication bias or 
influential cases. In the next sections, we discuss each of these findings in greater depth. 
Finding 1: General relationship of cognitive ability with ideology and prejudice 
The first main finding of our study was that people with greater cognitive resources 
are more likely to adhere to left-wing beliefs and tend to be less prejudiced, whereas those 
having lower cognitive abilities are more likely to endorse right-wing beliefs and be more 
prejudiced (average effect sizes of r = -.20, CI 95%:  -.23 to -.17; and r = -.19, CI 95%: -.23 to 
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-.16, respectively). The confidence interval reported provides considerable support for the 
notion that these findings are both meaningful and replicable. We further assessed the validity 
of our meta-analytical estimates with sensitivity analyses addressing the impact of both 
publication bias and outliers/influential studies. In general, these analyses underscore 
robustness in our meta-analytical study because the implications of the meta-analytic results 
and conclusions remain largely unaltered when adjusting for potential publication bias or 
when omitting outliers and overly influential studies.  
A straightforward comparison between the results of the present meta-analysis and the 
meta-analysis conducted by Van Hiel et al. (2010), who also investigated the relationship 
between cognitive ability and ideological attitudes, is not possible. First, Van Hiel et al. 
(2010) included ideological attitudes and ethnocentrism in the same analysis, whereas we 
performed two separate analyses. Second, and most importantly, Van Hiel et al. (2010) also 
included years of education as a proxy of cognitive ability, whereas we choose not to include 
this variable as an indicator of cognitive ability and instead focus only on objective tasks 
measuring cognitive ability. As can be seen from their results, years of education yields the 
strongest effect size compared to other indicators of cognitive ability, making their overall 
effect sizes for the different types of ideology higher than the present effect sizes.  
Moderator analyses revealed that the effect size in the present meta-analysis was 
relatively stable across different sample characteristics, such as gender, location and time 
frame, attesting to the robustness of the relationship. Only one moderator related to sample 
characteristics yielded a significant effect. Specifically, the strength of the effect size differed 
across age groups, with the strongest effect size for the relationship between cognitive ability 
and right-wing ideological attitudes in the group of adolescents. Although we do not have a 
clear explanation for this effect, it should be noted that adolescence constitutes the formative 
years of political ideology (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991), and 
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that cognitive ability might then yield its biggest impact. Future research can further examine 
this potential.  
Our effect sizes varied around r = -.20, and was largest in magnitude for 
authoritarianism (r = -.30, CI 95% -.34 to -.24) and ethnocentrism (r = -.28, CI 95% -.34 to -
.22). Clearly, these effects are not inconsequential, but rather are of a similar magnitude of 
other meta-analytic relations such as between contact and prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006), stereotypes and prejudice (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996), 
discrimination and prejudice (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008; Schütz & Six, 1996), 
personality factors and prejudice (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), and even stronger than relations 
between religiosity and prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). In fact, these effect sizes 
approximate those of the vast majority of personality and social psychology findings more 
generally (see, Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). With meta-analytic relations of this 
magnitude reliably observed, a strong case can be made that cognitive abilities are as 
important, and often more important, in explaining ideology and prejudice than many of the 
constructs commonly discussed in personality and social psychology textbooks. Hence, we 
strongly advise future models and theories aiming to uncover the psychological basis of 
ideology and prejudice, to provide a key role for cognitive ability (Dhont & Hodson, 2014; 
Hodson, 2014; Hodson & Busseri, 2012). 
An important reason for this longstanding interest in the cognitive basis of ideology 
lies in an attempt to uncover the scientific inaccuracy or invalidity of certain ideologies, and 
the superiority of other ideologies (Durrheim, 1997). Specifically, ideologies might seem 
inferior when they attract less intelligent people, whereas ideologies that attract intelligent 
people may appear to be more ‘correct’. To be clear, any attempt to show whether right- or 
left-wing ideologies are accurate or valid on the basis of the level of cognitive ability of their 
adherents is based on false premises and certainly not the goal of our present synthesis.  
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Moreover, we appreciate that this issue is a very delicate and controversial one (Dhont & 
Hodson, 2014; Hodson, 2014) that, for this reason, speaks to the need for a cumulative-
science-approach (i.e., meta-analysis).  Moreover, we would like to stress that, although right-
wing ideological attitudes relate to conservative and right-wing political party affiliation (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1996; Jost et al., 2003), our findings cannot be generalized to party identification. 
In other words, the current findings not necessarily imply that adherents of right-wing parties 
have lower cognitive abilities than adherents of left-wing parties. 
Finding 2: Different effect sizes for different types of broad cognitive ability 
The second important question of the present study pertained to the potential 
differences in effect sizes for different types of cognitive abilities. Previous studies (Deary et 
al., 2008; Heaven et al., 2011; Kemmelmeier, 2008) yielded somewhat conflicting outcomes. 
In our meta-analysis, we investigated two moderators in order to answer this question. First, 
we found that the strength of the relationship did not differ between studies focusing on one 
specific type of cognitive ability versus general cognitive ability. Second, we compared the 
effect sizes between different types of broad cognitive abilities as defined by CHC theory 
(McGrew, 2005; Schneider & McGrew, 2012).  Our analysis for right-wing attitude effect 
sizes varied significantly across ability types. To interpret this effect, we focus on 
comprehension-knowledge, fluid abilities and short-term memory, because we have a smaller 
number of participants (< 1000) for the other types of broad abilities. The strongest effect size 
was obtained for comprehension-knowledge (r = -.23), which refers to abilities based on 
previously acquired knowledge and skills valued by one’s culture. It includes general verbal 
information, language development, lexical knowledge, listening and communication 
abilities, and grammar sensitivity (Schneider & McGrew, 2012). The effect size was 
considerably smaller for fluid abilities (r = -.13), referring to abilities to solve unfamiliar 
problems and abstract reasoning, and for short-term memory (r = -.12), referring to abilities to 
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encode, maintain and manipulate information in the immediate situation. Although the 
moderator for type of primary broad ability was not significant in our analysis for prejudice, 
the same pattern of results emerged, with the strongest effect size for comprehension-
knowledge (r = -.26), and weaker effect sizes for fluid abilities (r = -.15) and short-term 
memory (r = -.13). 
These findings corroborate the studies of Heaven et al. (2011) and Kemmelmeier 
(2008) who found that verbal abilities are more strongly related to ideological attitudes 
compared to numerical and mathematical reasoning.  As noted by Heaven et al. (2011), 
ideologies are relevant to verbal narratives, arguments and point of views, but not directly to 
numerical abilities. Similarly, other researchers argue that ideology can be considered as a 
schema or a learned knowledge structure, including norms and values, beliefs and opinions 
(e.g. Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985). Hence, this might explain 
why comprehension-knowledge abilities may be especially relevant in relationship with 
ideology.  
Also of relevance to the present findings is the recognition that cognitive ability is 
associated with particular personality traits, which also lie at the basis of right-wing 
ideological attitudes and prejudice. More specifically, high Openness (Costa & McCrae, 
1992; Digman, 1990), which refers to a preference for novelty, variety and intense experience, 
lies at the basis of lower authoritarianism and conservatism, and lower prejudice (Block & 
Block, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). At the same time, several researchers have shown that 
Openness is also related to cognitive ability, with the strongest associations for 
comprehension-knowledge abilities, compared to other types of cognitive ability, such as fluid 
ability (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ashton, Lee, Vernon, & Jang, 2000). This common 
personality association may also provide insights into the stronger relationships of 
comprehension-knowledge abilities with right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice. 
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Whereas the effect of comprehension-knowledge ability is strongest, it is important to 
note that the other types of broad abilities (for which we obtained enough studies) also yielded 
negative and significant effects. This finding further attests to the robustness of this general 
relationship. However, on the basis of the present state of the literature we cannot make 
conclusive statements about all types of cognitive abilities. First, studies on cognitive ability 
and ideology and prejudice did not include every type of ability (e.g., to our knowledge, no 
study investigated auditory processing or quantitative knowledge). Second, for other types of 
cognitive ability, most notably long-term memory, processing speed and visual-spatial 
processing, we found only a few studies, which elicited potential statistical power issues in 
our analysis. Hence, we should be cautious not to over-interpret the results for these specific 
abilities. Future research administering a wide range of cognitive ability measures at the same 
time can provide a more decisive answer to this intriguing question.  
Finding 3: Different effect sizes for different types of ideological attitudes and prejudice  
Our analyses revealed that cognitive ability is not related to all types of right-wing 
ideological attitudes or prejudices to the same extent. First, in our analysis of right-wing 
ideological attitudes, we found the strongest effect size for authoritarianism as compared to 
conservatism and dogmatism. One possible explanation lies in particular rigid cognitive styles 
linked with cognitive ability, and most notably Need for Closure (NFC). Research indicated 
that lower cognitive ability is associated with a higher NFC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), 
which relates to an individual’s desire to come to a relatively quick closure in decisions and 
judgments (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Individuals with high NFC have 
a strong preference for structure, certainty, and predictability, and are repelled by ambiguity. 
Because of these needs, individuals with a high NFC are more attracted to right-wing 
ideological attitudes, because these attitudes stress the importance of traditional values and the 
resistance toward change (see Roets & Van Hiel, 2006). Of interest, NFC is more strongly 
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related to authoritarianism than other types of ideological attitudes, like conservatism 
(Chirumbolo, 2002; Crowson, Thoma, & Hestvold, 2005; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, Duriez, 
2004). Authoritarianism may be especially functional in reducing ambiguity and providing a 
sense of certainty, because “RWA attitudes… would provide for individuals the strongest level 
of closure on social and political issues” (Crowson et al., 2005, p. 574). In the present 
context, individuals with lower cognitive abilities may similarly benefit from more certainty 
and closure, which, in the context on ideas about society, are best met through authoritarian 
beliefs relative to other right-wing attitudes. Whereas cognitive styles may provide an 
explanation for the strongest effects found between cognitive ability and authoritarianism, we 
should note that the sensitivity bias analyses (see Table 4) revealed that the actual effect size 
of authoritarianism might be somewhat lower, bringing them closer to the effect sizes of 
conservatism and dogmatism. Hence, we should interpret these findings with caution.  
A second interesting finding concerned two types of prejudices. More specifically, 
ethnocentrism, which can be considered an indicator of generalized prejudice, yielded a 
stronger effect size than prejudices directed towards specific outgroups. In other words, 
cognitive ability related more strongly to negative attitudes and a dislike of other groups in 
general, rather than specific groups such as ethnic minorities or the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender) community. A similar effect can be found in research on the 
personality basis of prejudice. More specifically, Sibley and Duckitt (2008) found that (low) 
Agreeableness or Openness to Experience is more strongly related to measures of generalized 
than specific prejudices. These authors argued that, because specific types of prejudice are 
partly rooted in knowledge about and (personal) experiences with these particular groups, 
these situational and group-specific factors might attenuate the generalized effect of 
personality (see also Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011). Generalized prejudice, on the 
other hand, is more abstract and less influenced by group-specific attitudes and cognitions, 
Cognitive ability, ideological attitudes and prejudice  31 
 
yielding a stronger effect of personality. Similar processes can explain the present findings for 
cognitive ability as well. Cognitive ability might yield its strongest effects on generalized 
prejudice due to the reliance on general cognitive heuristics during judgment formation that is 
similar across all outgroups; in contrast, specific prejudice types are additionally influenced 
by factors uniquely related to the particular social group in question (including the social 
context).  
Finding 4: Little evidence for publication bias or distortion by outliers 
Given the controversial nature of studying the relationship of cognitive ability with 
right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice, a crucial question is to what extent the studies 
included in the current meta-analyses represent the entire sample collection. It might be that 
studies retrieving null findings or positive findings are more likely to be put away in file-
drawers.  A definite strength of this meta-analysis is that we addressed this issue by 
comprehensively addressing the impact of publication bias. These analyses, based upon visual 
inspection, regression, and trim-and-fill methods, do not yield evidence that publication bias 
is likely in the present meta-analytic study collection. Nevertheless, it remains important for 
future updates of this meta-analysis to further search for additional unpublished studies. 
Despite our widespread call for unpublished data, only three researchers shared their 
unpublished data and more unpublished data sets might be out somewhere. 
Taken together, our sensitivity analyses accounting for publication bias and removing 
outliers/influential studies, underscore and validate the robustness of our meta-analytical 
conclusions. Some other potential biases, however, could not be completely ruled out. First, it 
remains possible that the current meta-analytical conclusions do not reflect the true effects, 
due to measurement error. Even though adjusting for measurement error is recommended by 
some meta-analysts (particularly in the psychometric meta-analytical tradition of Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004; Kepes et al., 2013), we found insufficient information in the original studies 
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to conduct such artefact adjustments. Also, we acknowledge that it is possible that the results 
of our meta-analysis are somewhat influenced by indirect range restriction (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004; Kepes et al., 2013). Many studies consist of volunteers, and volunteers may 
tend to have higher than average cognitive ability. However, as information of the population 
variances on the outcome measures is essentially lacking in the original studies, it was not 
possible to correct for this artefact as part of the current sensitivity analyses.  
Alternative accounts  
 Some scholars have criticized a pure “cognitive” explanation of the negative 
relationship of cognitive ability with ideology and prejudice, and suggest alternative accounts 
explaining these relationships. More specifically, social desirability, education and socio-
economic status have often been proposed as explaining these effects. We elaborate on these 
alternative accounts in the next sections. 
Social desirability 
Studies included in our meta-analysis exclusively employed self-report measures of 
ideology and prejudice. Although self-report questionnaires are omnipresent in research and 
generally considered as a valid and reliable method to measure attitudes, it may provoke some 
interpretation problems as well, particularly with regard to social desirability. People may try 
to suppress or mask what they think to be socially unacceptable, such as prejudiced or 
ethnocentric attitudes and (extreme) right-wing ideological opinions. Indeed, intelligent and 
educated individuals are quite capable of suppressing their prejudices (e.g., Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 1986). Hence, an alternative account might be that individuals with lower cognitive 
abilities are less able to suppress their socially unacceptable attitudes, whereas individuals 
with greater cognitive abilities are more likely to present themselves as open-minded, liberal 
and unprejudiced.  
Cognitive ability, ideological attitudes and prejudice  33 
 
 However, whereas social desirability poses an important limitation to questionnaire 
studies, the self-report nature of the attitudinal measures cannot adequately explain the 
obtained meta-analytic relationships for various reasons. More specifically, utterances that 
support extreme right-wing ideological ideas and prejudice expressions are widely rejected in 
the general population, and it does not require especially strong cognitive abilities to comply 
with these norms. Moreover, relatively simple and straightforward questions are used to 
measure prejudice, tapping into (dis)liking of and avoiding contact with different out-groups, 
making it unlikely that only highly intelligent individuals are able to manipulate their answers 
on these questions (see Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Furthermore, the relations observed in the 
present results are similar to those in samples of young children (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 
2014; Kutner & Gordon, 1964), who often feel freer to express their own minds. Moreover, 
our effects are strongest (not weakest) in adolescence, a life phase where individuals are most 
conscious of social approval and norms. Given these arguments, we feel that increased social 
desirability among individuals with higher cognitive ability cannot explain completely the 
obtained relationships. However, future research might try to replicate the present finding 
employing other, implicit or more subtle measures for these attitudes which are less prone to 
social desirability concerns.  
 Education and SES 
Scholars have often suggested that socio-economic status (SES) and educational 
experiences may pose potential confounds in the relationship of cognitive ability with right-
wing ideological attitudes and intergroup prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; 
Christie, 1954). More specifically, because the education and cultural sophistication are 
known to influence the values and attitudes of individuals, and because higher education 
typically provides a “liberal climate”, high SES and participation in higher education may 
make individuals more liberal and left-wing and less prejudiced (e.g., Hello, Scheepers, 
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Vermulst, & Gerris, 2004). Indeed, empirical studies showed that educational level is 
negatively correlated with right-wing ideology (e.g., an effect size of r = -.33 in the meta-
analysis of Van Hiel et al., 2010), prejudice and ethnocentrism (e.g., Hello, Scheepers, & 
Sleegers, 2006; Meeusen et al., 2013). Hence, because individuals with higher cognitive 
ability are more likely to pursue higher and longer education, the effects of cognitive ability 
on ideological attitudes and prejudice might be explained by this “liberalizing effect” of 
education rather than by pure “cognitive effects.”  
However, empirical research suggests that a potential confounding effect of education 
and SES does not account for these relations. Most importantly, a range of studies reported 
that the relationships of cognitive ability with right-wing ideology and prejudice remain 
significant after statistically controlling for educational level and SES (Deary et al., 2008; 
Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Kanazawa, 2010; McCourt et al., 1999; Schoon et al., 2010; 
Sidanius & Lau, 1985). Moreover,  significant associations of cognitive ability with right-
wing ideological attitudes and prejudice have also been obtained in samples of children and 
young adolescents who have not yet experienced higher education (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 
2014), and among university student samples (e.g., Choma et al., 2014; Keiller, 2010) where 
education levels are largely equivalent across participants. In sum, whereas education and 
SES might, to some extent, explain the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing 
ideological attitudes and prejudice, it cannot serve as a single and exhaustive explanation.  
Towards new theories on the cognitive basis of right-wing ideology and prejudice 
 We introduce two new perspectives in the field of cognition and ideology, which hold 
promise for future research. First, we discuss the need to focus more research attention 
towards the interplay between cognitive ability and cognitive style in explaining ideology and 
prejudice. Second, we argue to study affective processes as well, and discuss the interplay 
between cognition and affect in the context of ideology and prejudice. 
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An integrated theory of cognition: the interplay between ability and style 
 Recent theorizing has stressed that both cognitive resources and motivation are 
important variables in decision-making and information processing (Kruglanski, 2004; 
Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Roets, Van Hiel, 
Cornelis, & Soetens, 2008; Wright & Kirby, 2001). For example, Kruglanski et al. (2007) 
have argued that cognitive resources (i.e., cognitive ability) and motivation (i.e., motivated 
cognition or cognitive style) are the two key ‘decision maker’ parameters in human judgment 
(see also Kruglanski, 2004). Although both of these variables might exert direct effects on 
judgment, they may show important multiplicative effects as well (see Roets et al., 2008).  
Potential joint influences (simultaneous or interaction effects) of cognitive ability and 
style are especially interesting in the context of the present research questions. Instead of 
probing into the effects of cognitive ability and cognitive style separately, it may be more 
interesting to considerer both concepts simultaneously (see Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson, 
2014; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). 
Adorno et al. (1950) already hinted to such a possibility, and they coined this “promising field 
of future research … the dynamics of intelligence” (p. 278). Cognitive ability in itself does 
not provide a complete answer on the question why people hold certain beliefs and attitudes; 
rather, the dynamic interplay between ability and style should be considered. 
Building on the current models of decision-making, one important finding deserves 
special attention here. When cognitive ability is lower, or task demands grossly exceed the 
individual’s resources, people may cease further efforts to solve the problem (Roets et al., 
2008; Wright & Kirby, 2001). It is possible that such a breakdown in one’s willingness to 
invest in information gathering has also great relevance for the development of right-wing 
ideology and prejudice. People lower in cognitive ability may perceive the world as 
particularly difficult to understand, and irrespective of their cognitive style preferences, 
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gravitate toward simpler heuristics and traditional worldviews instead of being open for new 
and challenging information (e.g., Heaven et al., 2011; Keiller, 2010; Stankov, 2009). It is 
unfortunate that, at least to our knowledge, no single study has investigated the interplay 
between cognitive ability and style measures in the context of right-wing ideological attitudes 
or prejudice. In order to develop comprehensive cognitive theories about right-wing 
ideological attitudes and prejudice, future studies should certainly include both cognition 
components. 
An integrated theory of cognition and affect 
We acknowledge that a one-sided focus on cognition is rather limited and that, in 
order to understand right-wing ideological attitudes and prejudice, affective factors should 
also be considered. Thus, a more complete model of right-wing ideological attitudes and 
prejudice arguably incorporates affect as well. In classic theories on right-wing ideological 
attitudes, this affective component was thought to be dominant (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; 
Wilson, 1973). For example, Meloen (1997) argued: “Adorno et al. furthermore hardly used 
the concept of cognition, as they were convinced that also more emotional factors were 
involved, while cognitions often would merely serve as rationalizations” (p. 650). Although 
both cognitive and affective variables have been studied separately, theoretical models and 
empirical studies have rarely examined these variables simultaneously. Recently, Dhont and 
Hodson (2014; see also Hodson, 2014) introduced the Cognitive Ability and Style to 
Evaluation (CASE) model, a conceptual model of ideology and prejudice, which holds that 
right-wing ideology and prejudice result from the interplay between cognitive, affective and 
motivational factors. Specifically, the CASE model proposes that individuals with lower 
cognitive abilities and preferences for simple structure, order and predictability are more 
inclined to perceive the surrounding societal context as threatening. In turn, threat stimulates a 
focus on the status-quo, which ultimately develops into right-wing and conservative 
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ideologies and prejudice. However, this model is in need of future research to test its 
assumptions.  
Limitations of the current state of the literature  
As a final note, we would like to address two limitations of the current state of the 
literature concerning cognitive ability, ideology and prejudice, which we think are important 
issues to tackle in future research. First, whereas a large focus is placed on social-cultural 
right-wing attitudes in relationship with cognitive ability, few studies have investigated 
economic-hierarchical attitudes in this context. We will further reflect on the possible 
relationship. Second, we discuss the need for cross-cultural validation of the obtained 
relationships.  
Cognitive ability and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes 
In the literature on cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes almost all 
attention is directed towards social-cultural ideological right-wing attitudes. However, Duckitt 
and colleagues (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) distinguished between social-
cultural attitudes and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, and this distinction proved 
to be very important for our understanding of the attitudinal basis of prejudice. Social 
dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is the most 
frequently studied variable situated in the economic-hierarchical domain of right-wing 
ideological attitudes. SDO is defined as a preference for hierarchically structured group 
relations and inequality among social groups. A relevant question, then, is whether cognitive 
ability is related to economic-hierarchical attitudes to the same extent as to social-cultural 
attitudes. Only a few studies have directly compared social-cultural attitudes and economic-
hierarchical ideological attitudes in relationship with cognitive ability. Heaven et al. (2011) 
reported that cognitive ability yields stronger associations with RWA than SDO. Likewise, 
Choma and colleagues (2014) observed that RWA, but not SDO, is significantly related to a 
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lower cognitive ability. A recent study by Oskarsson and colleagues (2014) reported that 
general cognitive ability is positively related to right-wing economic attitudes. Similarly, Carl 
(2014, 2015) showed that cognitive ability was positively associated with fiscally and 
economic conservative beliefs.  
 These studies thus seem to suggest that the relationship between cognitive ability and 
economic-hierarchical attitudes is distinct from the relationship between cognitive ability and 
social-cultural attitudes. However, based on the few available empirical studies on the 
relationship between cognitive ability and economic-hierarchical attitudes, we cannot make 
strong claims about the strength and direction of this relationship. Therefore, we encourage 
more systematic research employing a wide range of measures in the economic-hierarchical 
domain in order to understand the role of cognitive abilities in the development of economic-
hierarchical attitudes.   
The impact of culture: universal or culture-specific relationship? 
 An important limitation of the current state of the literature on cognitive ability and 
ideology and prejudice resides in the fact that the literature is overrepresented by studies 
conducted in Western societies. As a result, our meta-analytic finding can only be applied 
with certainty in these societies; whether or not these findings can be generalized to non-
Western societies largely remains an unanswered question.  
According to the Cultural-Mediation Hypothesis (Woodley, 2010, 2011), we could 
find different patterns of results in other societies. More specifically, Woodley asserts that 
individuals with higher cognitive ability are more likely to be aware of the advantages of 
adhering to norms and beliefs dominant in one’s society and hence will shift their own 
attitudes and beliefs towards this normative center. As a result, and in line with the present 
findings, in societies with rather liberal norms (such as most Western societies), individuals 
with greater cognitive skills are predicted to be generally more left-wing. However, in 
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societies characterized by more conservative and rightist norms and belief systems, one could 
expect those individuals to shift to the right side of the spectrum. We know of one study that 
supports this interesting possibility. Katz (1990) reported that among White South African 
students, a group characterized by conservative views at that time, greater cognitive ability 
was associated with more conservative and traditionalistic views. However, given that this is 
the only study in its kind and that its findings did not apply to all ability tasks used, we 
recommend caution in interpreting these results. In sum, in order to provide a conclusive 
answer to the question whether the present findings are context-specific and typical for 
Western societies, or whether the obtained relationships can be considered universal, we need 
more elaborate research on the relationship of cognitive ability with ideology and prejudice in 
culturally diverse societal contexts.   
Conclusion 
The present meta-analysis reveals relationships of small-to-moderate strength between 
(lower) cognitive ability and right-wing ideology and prejudice. These findings further 
enforce the call of Hodson and Busseri (2012) that “…cognitive abilities, particular in 
relationship to ideology, need to become increasingly focal to and integrated into existing 
literatures” (p. 193). Future research should not refrain from further investigating this 
interesting, albeit controversial, relationship (Hodson, 2014). Rather, the inclusion of 
cognitive ability as an important variable in a comprehensive model of ideology and 
prejudice, together with other individual differences and situational factors, will provide a 
fuller account of why some individuals are less tolerant and more prejudiced than others.  
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Table 1. An overview of all studies included in the meta-analysis 














Adams & Vidulich 
(1962) 36 
Young 
adults mix USA /Canada Dogmatism Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory -0,44 
Adorno et al. (1950) 342 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad 
Writing & 
Reading -0,20 
Adorno et al. (1950) 168 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Ethnocentrism Broad   
Writing & 
Reading -0,08 
Adorno et al. (1950) 104 Adults Male-only USA/Canada Ethnocentrism General   - -0,32 
Adorno et al. (1950) 104 Adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,48 
Adorno et al. (1950) 77 Adults Male-only USA/Canada Ethnocentrism General   - -0,28 
Berkowitz & Wolkon 
(1964) 76 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,27 
Bettinghaus et al. 
(1970) 120 Mix Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   Fluid -0,19 
Block & Block (2006) 46 Children Male-only USA/Canada Conservatism General   - -0,30 
Block & Block (2006) 49 Children Female-only USA/Canada Conservatism General   - -0,28 
Bobo & Licari (1989) 1473 Adults Mix USA/Canada Prejudice Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,22 
Cognitive ability, ideological attitudes and prejudice  60 
 
Boshier (1973) 100 Mix Mix Other Conservatism Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory 0,03 
Bouchard et al. (2003) 355 Adults Mix Other Conservatism General   - -0,23 
Carl (2014) 12589 Adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,22 
Choma et al (2014) 198 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad   Fluid -0,09 
Christensen (1963) 117 
Young 
adults Female-only USA/Canada Dogmatism General   - -0,01 
Christensen (1963) 49 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Dogmatism General   - 0,00 
Christie (1954) 182 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,48 
Clark (1968) 35 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,52 
Costello & Hodson 
(2014) 20 Children Mix USA/Canada Prejudice Broad   Fluid -0,39 
Costello & Hodson 
(2014) 53 Children Mix USA/Canada Prejudice General   - -0,45 
Costin (1965) 67 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,11 
Crowson et al. (2007) 276 
Young 
Mix USA/Canada Conservatism General   - -0,02 
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adults 
Davids (1955) 20 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,40 
Davids & Eriksen 
(1957) 48 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,24 
Deary et al. (2008) 3412 Children Male-only Europe/UK Prejudice Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory -0,12 
Deary et al. (2008) 3412 Children Male-only Europe/UK Conservatism Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory -0,13 
Deary et al. (2008) 3658 Children Female-only Europe/UK Prejudice Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory -0,13 
Deary et al. (2008) 3658 Children Female-only Europe/UK Conservatism Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory -0,13 
Egan (1989) 94 
Adolesc
ents  Mix Europe/UK Ethnocentrism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,43 
Egan (1989) 94 
Adolesc






adults Mix USA /Canada Authoritarianism Broad   Fluid 0,15 
Eisenman & Cherry 
(1970) 263 
Young 
adults Mix USA /Canada Authoritarianism Broad   
Long Term 
Memory -0,20 
Eysenck (1954) 86 Adults Male-only Europe/UK Ethnocentrism Broad   Fluid -0,25 
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Eysenck (1954) 86 Adults Male-only Europe/UK Authoritarianism Broad   Fluid -0,28 
Fraley et al. (2012) 635 Children Mix USA/Canada Conservatism General   - -0,12 
Francis (1997) 711 
Adolesc
ents  Mix Europe/UK Dogmatism Broad   Fluid -0,18 
Gough (1951) 271 
Adolesc
ents  Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,43 
Heaven et al. (2011) 375 
Adolesc
ents  Mix Other Authoritarianism Broad   
Writing & 
Reading -0,26 
Hello et al. (2006) 301 
Young 
adults Mix Europe/UK Prejudice Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,17 
Hello et al. (2006) 301 
Young 
adults Mix Europe/UK Authoritarianism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,25 
Himmelweit & Swift 
(1971) 614 
Adolesc
ents  Male-only Europe/UK Authoritarianism General   - -0,27 
Iyer et al. (2012) 8651 Adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad   Fluid -0,05 
Jacobson & Rettig 
(1959) 354 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,22 
Jones (1957) 220 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,22 
Kanazawa (2010) 13058 
Adolesc
ents  Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,24 
Kanazawa (2010) 13034 Adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad   
Comprehension-
-0,07 
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Knowledge 
Katz (1988) 100 
Young 
adults Mix Other Conservatism Broad   Fluid 0,21 
Katz (1988) 110 
Young 
adults Mix Other Conservatism Broad   Fluid 0,03 
Katz (1990) 100 
Young 
adults Mix Other Conservatism Broad   
Processing 
Speed 0,20 
Keiller (2010) 257 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Prejudice General   - -0,36 
Keiller (2010) 257 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,28 
Kemmelmeier (2008) 5893 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,04 
Kranou (unpublished) 425 
Young 
adults Mix Europe/UK Conservatism Broad   Fluid -0,12 
Kutner & Gordon 
(1964) 33 Children Mix USA/Canada Ethnocentrism Broad   Fluid -0,32 
Lapsey & Enright 
(1979) 94 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   Fluid -0,26 
Long & Ziller (1965) 72 
Young 
adults Female-only USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   Visual-Spatial -0,20 
Marks & McDougall 
57 
Adolesc
Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,68 
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(1959) ents  
McCourt et al. (1999) 274 Adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,37 




Frederiksen (1958) 232 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad   Visual-Spatial 0,01 
Moore et al. (1984) 40 
Adolesc
ents  Mix USA/Canada Prejudice General   - 0,00 
O’Connor (1952) 57 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Ethnocentrism Broad   Fluid -0,37 
Oskarsson et al. (in 
press) 1946 Adults Male-only Europe/UK Conservatism General   - 0,18 
Rokeach (1951) 144 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Ethnocentrism General   - -0,28 
Rubenstein (2003) 111 
Young 
adults Mix Other Authoritarianism Broad   
Long Term 
Memory -0,67 
Scarr (1981) 914 Mix Mix Usa/Canada Authoritarianism General    -0,35 
Schoon et al. (2010) 4537 Children Female-only Europe/UK Prejudice Broad   Fluid -0,15 
Schoon et al. (2010) 4537 Children Female-only Europe/UK Conservatism Broad   Fluid -0,15 
Schoon et al. (2010) 4267 Children Male-only Europe/UK Prejudice Broad   Fluid -0,17 
Schoon et al. (2010) 4267 Children Male-only Europe/UK Conservatism Broad   Fluid -0,18 
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Shook & Fazio (2009) 58 
Young 
adults Mix Usa/Canada Conservatism Broad   
Short-Term 
Memory 0,08 
Sidanius & Lau 
(1989) 5655 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Prejudice General   - -0,18 
Siegel (1956) 60 
Young 
adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism General   - -0,19 
Siegel (1956) 60 Adults Male-only USA/Canada Authoritarianism General    -0,21 
Stankov (2009) 732 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism General   - -0,35 
Stankov (2009) 430 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad   
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,40 
Stankov (2009) 288 
Young 
adults Mix Other Conservatism Broad   Fluid -0,23 
Taylor & Dunnette 
(1974) 79 Adults Male-only USA/Canada Dogmatism General   - 0,29 
Thompson & Michel 
(1972) 379 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism General   - -0,20 
Uhes & Shaver (1970) 316 
Adolesc
ents  Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad   
Long Term 
Memory -0,26 
Vezzali et al. 
(unpublished) 122 Children Mix Europe/UK Prejudice Broad  Fluid -0,13 
Vezzali et al. 
395 Children Mix Europe/UK Prejudice Broad  Fluid 0,06 






Von Stülpnagel & 
Steffens (2010) 148 
Young 
adults Mix Europe/UK Prejudice Broad  
Processing 
Speed -0,13 




USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad  Fluid -0,42 
Wegmann (1992) 29 Adults Mix USA/Canada Authoritarianism Broad  Fluid -0,49 
Xu et al. (2013) 486 Adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad  Fluid -0,17 
Xu et al. (2013) 540 Adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad  Fluid -0,10 
Xu et al. (2013) 460 Adults Mix USA/Canada Conservatism Broad  Fluid -0,12 
Zagona & Zurcher 
(1965) 60 
Young 
adults Mix USA/Canada Dogmatism Broad 
Comprehension-
Knowledge -0,18 
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Table 2. Moderators of effect sizes for studies on the relationship of cognitive ability and 
right-wing ideological attitudes 
Moderator N k r  95%CI Qb Qw 
 
I² 
Total Set 84017 67 -.20 
*** 
-.23 to -.17  1058.06 
*** 
93.76 
General or primary 
broad ability 
   
 
 1.64  
 
39.16 
General Ability 7820 25 -.24 
*** 
-.34 to -.14  442.18 
*** 
94.57 
Primary Broad Ability  76197 42 -.17 
*** 
-.21 to -.14  614.59 
*** 
93.33 













45915 11 -.23 
*** 
-.30 to -.16  385.15 
*** 
97.40 
Fluid 21207 18 -.13 
*** 
-.18 to -.09  102.01 
*** 
83.34 
Short-term memory 7264 5 -.12 
*** 





690 3 -.39 
** 
-.62 to -.11  30.33 
*** 
93.41 
Processing Speed 100 1 .20 
 





304 2 -.07 
 
-.27 to .13  2.40 
 
58.33 
Writing & Reading 717 2 -.23 
*** 
-.30 to -.16  .71 
 
.00 
Type of ideological 
attitudes 







Authoritarianism 18142 27 -.30 
*** 





Conservatism 63740 27 -.13 
*** 





Dogmatism 2135 13 -.17 
*** 












Children 16604 7 -.15 
*** 





Adolescents 15496 8 -.32 
*** 





Young Adults 12090 35 -.19 
*** 





Adults 38693 14 -.15 
*** 





Mix 1134 3 -.19 
 














Female-only 8433 5 -.14 
*** 





Male-only 11168 15 -.18 
*** 





Mix 64416 47 -.21 
*** 












USA/Canada 62427 48 -.21 
*** 





Europe/UK 20051 11 -.17 
*** 





Other 1539 8 -.14 
 





Time of data 
collection 
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1950 – 1969  2462 20 -.28 *** -.36 to -.19   85.07 *** 77.66 
1970 – 1989  3269 13 -.17 *** -.27 to -.07   86.82 *** 86.18 
1990 – present 78286 34 -.17 *** -.21 to -.13   821.27 *** 95.98 
 
Note.  
N =  number of participants; k = number of studies; CI = confidence interval; Qb = 
homogeneity statistic between classes; Qw = homogeneity statistic within classes. I² = 
homogeneity statistic (percentage of heterogeneity).
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .007 (.05/7) 
All cognitive ability measures are coded so that higher scores reflect higher cognitive ability.
1
 
For this moderator analyses, we excluded the 27 samples measuring general ability, because 
these studies relate to a combination of different types of cognitive ability. Hence, this 
moderator analysis only based on the 42 samples with measures for one specific type of broad 
ability. 
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Table 3. Moderators of effect sizes for studies on the relationship of cognitive ability and 
prejudice 
Moderator N k r  95% CI Qb Qw 
 
I² 
Total Set 27011 23 -.19 
*** 
-.23 to -.16  109.78 
*** 
79.96 
General or primary 
broad ability 
   
 
 3.6  
 
72.21 
General Ability 6330 7 -.27 
*** 
-.36 to -.18  18.67 
** 
67.86 
Primary Broad Ability  20681 16 -.17 
*** 
-.21 to -.13  85.76 
*** 
82.51 




   
 





3778 4 -.26 
*** 
-.32 to -.19  10.70 
* 
71.97 
Fluid 9517 8 -.15 
*** 
-.21 to -.08    25.41 
*** 
72.45 
Short-term memory 7070 2 -.13 
*** 
-.15 to -.10  0.18 
 
.00 
Processing Speed 148 1 -.13 
 
-.29 to .03  .00 
 
.00 
Writing & Reading 168 1 -.08 
 
-.23 to .07  .00 
 
.00 







Ethnocentrism 2673 9 -.28 
*** 





Prejudice towards  
specific groups 
24338 14 -.16 
*** 












Children 16497 9 -.13 
*** 





Adolescents 134 2 -.24 
 





Young Adults 6730 7 -.21 
*** 





Adults 1740 4 -.23 
*** 





Mix 1910 1 -.29 
*** 














Female-only 8195 2 -.14 
*** 





Male-only 8114 6 -.16 
*** 





Mix 10702 15 -.23 
*** 












USA/Canada 18930 12 -.25 
*** 





Europe/UK 8081 11 -.16 
*** 





Time of data 
collection 







1950 – 1969  583 6 -.25 *** -.34 to -.16   6.98   28.37 
1970 – 1989  7348 5 -.22 *** -.28 to -.15   10.25 * 60.97 
1990 – present 19080 12 -.17 *** -.22 to -.12   83.51 *** 86.83 
 
Note.  
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N =  number of participants; k = number of studies; CI = confidence interval; Qb = 
homogeneity statistic between classes; Qw = homogeneity statistic within classes. I² = 
homogeneity statistic (percentage of heterogeneity).
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .007 (.05/7) 
All cognitive ability measures are coded so that higher scores reflect higher cognitive ability. 
1
 For this moderator analyses, we excluded the 7 samples measuring general ability,  because 
these studies relate to a combination of different types of cognitive ability. Hence, this 
moderator analysis only based on the 16 samples with measures for one specific type of broad 
ability.
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Table 4. Effect sizes based on sensitivity analyses correcting for publication bias and outliers/influential studies  
 k Original estimate 
(95% CI) 




 k Without 
outliers
 
Right-wing ideological attitudes 67 -.20 (-.23, -.17)  -.15 (-.18, -.12) -.13 (-.17, -.10) -.15 (-.17, -.12) 64 -.20 (-.23, -.17) 
Authoritarianism 27 -.30 (-.34, -.24)  -.30 (-.34, -.24) -.21 (-.26,-.17) -.23 (-.27, -.20) 26 -.28 (-.32, -.23) 
Conservatism 27 -.13 (-.17, -.08) -.13 (-.17, -.08) -.12 (-.19, -.06) -.12 (-.17, -.08) 26 -.14 (-.18, -.10) 
Dogmatism
c
 13 -.17 (-.25, -.09) -.13 (-.22, -.04) -.20 (-.16, -.08) -.18 (-.29, -.06) 12 -.20 (-.26, -.14) 
        
Prejudice 23 -.19 (-.23, -.16)  -.18 (-.22, -.14)  -.15 (-.19, -.11) -.17 (-.19, -.14)  22 -.18 (-.21, -.15) 
Ethnocentrism
c
 9 -.28 (-.34, -.22)  -.26 (-.32, -.19)  -.28 (-.38,-.20) -.28 (-.34, -.22) 8 -.28 (-.36, -.19) 




14 -.16 (-.19, -.13)  -.16 (-.19, -.12) -.15 (-.20, -.10) -.16 (-18, -.13) 14 -.16 (-.19, -.13) 
 
Note. All estimates are significant at p < .001.  
a 
PET-PEESE is a conditional estimating procedure. Because PET-results are all significant 
(hence, rejecting the null hypothesis b0 =0), the PEESE-results should be interpreted as the best estimates of the true effects corrected for 
publication bias. 
b 
Estimates for these sub-distributions should be interpreted with caution as there are based on a limited set of studies (Sterne & 
Egger, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Forest plot for the meta-analysis for ideological right-wing attitudes, grouped by 
type of ideological attitude (authoritarianism, conservatism and dogmatism).  
  Group by
outcome measure
Study name Statistics for each study Correlation and 95%  CI
Lower Upper 
Correlation limit limit Total
authoritarianism Carl 2014 -0,220 -0,237 -0,203 12589
authoritarianism Scarr 1981 -0,350 -0,406 -0,292 914
authoritarianism Himmelweit & Swift 1971 -0,270 -0,342 -0,195 614
authoritarianism Heaven et al 2011 -0,260 -0,352 -0,163 375
authoritarianism Jacobson & Rettig 1959 -0,220 -0,317 -0,118 354
authoritarianism Adorno et al 1950a -0,200 -0,300 -0,096 342
authoritarianism Hello et al 2006 -0,250 -0,353 -0,141 301
authoritarianism McCourt et al 1999 -0,370 -0,468 -0,263 274
authoritarianism Gough 1951 -0,430 -0,522 -0,328 271
authoritarianism Eisenman & Cherry  1972 -0,202 -0,315 -0,083 263
authoritarianism Keiller 2010 -0,280 -0,389 -0,163 257
authoritarianism Messick & Frederiksen 1958 0,010 -0,119 0,139 232
authoritarianism Jones 1957 -0,220 -0,342 -0,090 220
authoritarianism Choma et al 2014 -0,085 -0,222 0,055 198
authoritarianism Christie 1954 -0,480 -0,585 -0,360 182
authoritarianism Rubenstein 2003 -0,670 -0,761 -0,553 111
authoritarianism Adorno et al  1950b -0,480 -0,616 -0,317 104
authoritarianism Eysenck 1954 -0,280 -0,464 -0,072 86
authoritarianism Berkowitz & Wolkon 1964 -0,270 -0,467 -0,047 76
authoritarianism Siegel 1956a -0,190 -0,423 0,067 60
authoritarianism Siegel 1956b -0,210 -0,440 0,046 60
authoritarianism Marks & McDougall 1959 -0,680 -0,799 -0,510 57
authoritarianism Eidelman unpublished 0,150 -0,120 0,399 55
authoritarianism Wegmann  1992a -0,420 -0,625 -0,160 50
authoritarianism Davids & Eriksen 1957 -0,240 -0,491 0,047 48
authoritarianism Wegmann  1992b -0,490 -0,726 -0,151 29
authoritarianism Davids 1955 -0,400 -0,716 0,052 20
authoritarianism -0,295 -0,344 -0,244 18142
conservatism Kanazawa 2010a -0,240 -0,256 -0,224 13058
conservatism Kanazawa 2010b -0,073 -0,090 -0,056 13034
conservatism Iyer et al 2012 -0,051 -0,072 -0,030 8651
conservatism Kemmelmeier 2008 -0,040 -0,065 -0,014 5893
conservatism Schoon et al 2010a -0,150 -0,178 -0,121 4537
conservatism Schoon et al 2010b -0,180 -0,209 -0,151 4267
conservatism Deary et al 2008b -0,130 -0,162 -0,098 3658
conservatism Deary et al 2008a -0,130 -0,163 -0,097 3412
conservatism Oskarsson et al in press 0,180 0,137 0,223 1946
conservatism Stankov 2009a -0,350 -0,412 -0,285 732
conservatism Fraley et al 2012 -0,120 -0,196 -0,043 635
conservatism Xu et al 2013b -0,100 -0,183 -0,016 540
conservatism Xu et al 2013a -0,170 -0,255 -0,082 486
conservatism Xu et al 2013c -0,120 -0,209 -0,029 460
conservatism Stankov 2009b -0,400 -0,477 -0,317 430
conservatism Kranou unpublished -0,120 -0,213 -0,025 425
conservatism Bouchard et al 2003 -0,230 -0,326 -0,129 355
conservatism Stankov 2009c -0,230 -0,337 -0,118 288
conservatism Crowson et al 2007 -0,020 -0,138 0,098 276
conservatism Katz 1988a 0,207 0,021 0,380 110
conservatism Boshier 1973 0,030 -0,167 0,225 100
conservatism Katz 1988b 0,032 -0,165 0,227 100
conservatism Katz 1990 0,197 0,000 0,378 100
conservatism Egan  1989 -0,540 -0,669 -0,379 94
conservatism Shook & Fasio  2009 0,080 -0,182 0,331 58
conservatism Block & Block 2006b -0,280 -0,520 0,001 49
conservatism Block & Block 2006a -0,300 -0,543 -0,011 46
conservatism -0,126 -0,171 -0,081 63740
dogmatism Francis 1997 -0,180 -0,250 -0,108 711
dogmatism Thompson & Michel 1972 -0,200 -0,295 -0,101 379
dogmatism Uhes & Shaver 1970 -0,260 -0,360 -0,154 316
dogmatism Bettinghaus et al 1970 -0,185 -0,349 -0,010 120
dogmatism Christensen 1963a -0,010 -0,191 0,172 117
dogmatism Lapsey & Enright 1979 -0,260 -0,439 -0,061 94
dogmatism Taylor & Dunnette 1974 0,290 0,074 0,480 79
dogmatism Long & Ziller 1965 -0,200 -0,413 0,033 72
dogmatism Costin 1965 -0,110 -0,341 0,134 67
dogmatism Zagona & Zurcher 1965 -0,180 -0,415 0,077 60
dogmatism Christensen 1963b 0,000 -0,281 0,281 49
dogmatism Adams & Vidulich 1962 -0,443 -0,656 -0,164 36
dogmatism Clark 1968 -0,521 -0,709 -0,263 35
dogmatism -0,172 -0,252 -0,089 2135
Overall -0,194 -0,225 -0,162 84017
-1,00 -0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00
Fav ours A Fav ours B
Meta Analysis
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Study name Statistics for each study Correlation and 95%  CI
Lower Upper 
Correlation limit limit Total
ethnocentrism Meeusen et al 2013 -0,290 -0,331 -0,248 1910
ethnocentrism Adorno et al 1950a -0,080 -0,229 0,072 168
ethnocentrism Rockeach 1951 -0,280 -0,424 -0,122 144
ethnocentrism Adorno et al  1950b -0,320 -0,483 -0,136 104
ethnocentrism Egan  1989 -0,430 -0,582 -0,249 94
ethnocentrism Eysenck 1954 -0,250 -0,439 -0,040 86
ethnocentrism Adorno et al 1950c -0,280 -0,474 -0,060 77
ethnocentrism O'connor 1952 -0,368 -0,574 -0,119 57
ethnocentrism Kutner & Gordon 1964 -0,322 -0,582 -0,002 33
ethnocentrism -0,280 -0,337 -0,220 2673
prejudice Sidanius & Lau 1989 -0,180 -0,205 -0,155 5655
prejudice Schoon et al 2010a -0,150 -0,178 -0,121 4537
prejudice Schoon et al 2010b -0,170 -0,199 -0,141 4267
prejudice Deary et al 2008b -0,130 -0,162 -0,098 3658
prejudice Deary et al 2008a -0,120 -0,153 -0,087 3412
prejudice Bobo & Licari 1989 -0,220 -0,268 -0,171 1473
prejudice Vezalli et al unpublished b 0,060 -0,039 0,158 395
prejudice Hello et al 2006 -0,170 -0,278 -0,058 301
prejudice Keiller 2010 -0,360 -0,462 -0,249 257
prejudice Von Stülpnagel & Steffens 2010 -0,130 -0,285 0,032 148
prejudice Vezalli et al unpublished a -0,130 -0,301 0,049 122
prejudice Costello & Hodson 2014b -0,450 -0,642 -0,205 53
prejudice Moore et al 1984 0,000 -0,312 0,312 40
prejudice Costello & Hodson 2014a -0,390 -0,710 0,063 20
prejudice -0,160 -0,193 -0,126 24338
Overall -0,187 -0,216 -0,158 27011
-1,00 -0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00
Favours A Favours B
Meta Analysis
Cognitive ability, ideological attitudes and prejudice  75 
 
Figure 3. Contour-enhanced funnel plots with trim-and-fill imputations for cognitive ability 
and right-wing ideological attitudes. The black points represent the real studies; the white 
points represent the imputed studies. If missing studies are imputed in areas where non-
significant studies would be plotted (no shading), the observed asymmetry may be due to 
publication bias. If missing studies are imputed in areas of statistical significance (darker 
shading), publication bias is less likely. 
A) Right-wing ideological attitudes (all) 
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Figure 4. Contour-enhanced funnel plots with trim-and-fill imputations for cognitive ability and prejudice. The black points represent the real 
studies; the white points represent the imputed studies. If missing studies are imputed in areas where non-significant studies would be plotted (no 
shading), the observed asymmetry may be due to publication bias. If missing studies are imputed in areas of statistical significance (darker 
shading), publication bias is less likely. 
A) Prejudice (all) 
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Footnotes 
                                                          
i
 Despite being under-represented in theoretical accounts of ideological attitudes and 
prejudice, there exists considerable interest in this topic, among academics and lay people; 
Hodson and Busseri (2012) was the most downloaded article of any APS journal in that year, 
with over 56,000 downloads (see http://www.psychologicalscience.org/redesign/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Journals.pdf). Topics generating this degree of interest clearly 
warrant, we argue, a quantitative review.   
 
ii
 Conservatism consists of measures of political conservatism, social conservatism, and 
measures combining both social and economic conservatism. 
